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I
INTRODUCTION
In 1975, and now again in 1985, there has arisen a public perception of a
"malpractice crisis." '  The crisis, then and now, principally troubles
physicians, who believe that liability insurance premiums are too high. A
crisis seen through the eyes of doctors and measured in premium dollars
naturally generates responses evaluated in terms of effect on premiums. The
needs of patients and consumers never even enter the debate.
Many Americans confront enormous difficulty obtaining affordable
medical care of decent quality. This article describes these main consumer
problems, traces the complex relationships between them and legal actions
for medical malpractice, and briefly critiques current proposals for
malpractice reform. The thesis of the article is that even in the best of
circumstances legal claims for medical malpractice seldom provide effective
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1. The malpractice crisis of 1985 differs from that of 1975 in only two important ways. First, in
1975 it seemed that not all physicians in some states could purchase any malpractice insurance,
regardless of price. In 1975, private malpractice insurers threatened to leave the market in several
states unless they were given large premium increases, and no other insurers appeared willing to step
in and provide coverage. Since 1975, availability of coverage has improved. For example, 31 states
have created joint underwriting associations, mandated consortiums of private insurance companies
that can, if necessary, be forced to write medical malpractice insurance at state-set rates, without risk
of loss or opportunity for profit. See, e.g., R. PIERCE, WHAT LEGISLATORS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5 (1985).
Second, the capacity to understand the financial situation of malpractice insurers has improved in
the past decade. Prior to 1985, neither insurance rating organizations nor regulators collected data
on medical malpractice as a line of insurance separate from general liability. Without rigorous
information, policymakers relied on anecdote and political argument. For instance, the 1975 "crisis"
was precipitated when one multinational conglomerate, the Teledyne Corporation, pulled its
subsidiary, the Argonaut Company, out of the malpractice business. Argonaut had been the primary
provider of medical malpractice insurance in several states. Argonaut had at first demanded massive
rate increases, but neither the insurance industry nor the state regulators had sufficient data to
understand that Argonaut's demands were not dictated by their risk experience. Ignorance
generated panic. See S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 161-95
(1978).
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners subsequently discovered that 1975, the
year of crisis, was profitable for the malpractice insurance industry. In 1975 operating profit for all
lines of insurance was one percent, while for malpractice insurance it was nine percent. National
Assoc. of Ins. Comm'rs, Report on Profitability by Line and by State for the Year 1976 (Aug. 12,
1977) (unpublished draft). In 1985, there is little reason to believe that malpractice insurers as a
class face acute financial distress. See R. PIERCE, supra, at 4-7.
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means to address patients' real problems. Although society could and should
develop stronger means to deal with these problems, malpractice "reforms"
adopted solely to reduce premiums generally make things worse for
consumers.
II
LEGAL CLAIMS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE Do LITrLE TO ADDRESS
THE REAL PROBLEMS OF HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS
Americans seeking medical care face three major problems: (1) many
cannot obtain necessary services, (2) costs are unreasonably high, and (3) the
quality of care provided is often not as good as it should be and the human
relationships often are not healing. Legal actions for medical malpractice
have some relevance to these central issues, but not much.
A. Access to Service
In 1984, fifteen percent of the American people had no public or private
medical insurance, 2 and many more had only very thin coverage. 3 Over a
quarter of women in the prime child-bearing years (eighteen to twenty-four)
have no form of health insurance to help pay the $3,200 average expense of a
normal delivery.4 The uninsured population has grown in recent years. 5
Lacking coverage, the uninsured must pay out of his or her own pocket or
seek reduced-price or charity care.
Even as the need for charity service from doctors and hospitals becomes
more urgent, an increased ethic of competition in medical care and reduced
government payments for services for the poor have encouraged hospitals to
2. Swartz, People Without Health Insurance, (Mar. 12, 1985) (presentation at American Health
Planning Association annual conference, Washington, D.C.) (based on Dep't of Commerce Current
Population Survey data on coverage states in March of that year; a lower percentage was uncovered
during the entire year).
3. Farley, Who Are the Underinsured? (Nov. 1984) (paper presented at the American Public
Health Association). For good discussions of patterns of uninsurance, see 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
SECURING ACCESS To HEALTH CARE 93-100 (1983); Davis & Rowland, Uninsured and Underserved:
Inequities in Health Care in the United States, MILBANK MEM. FUND Q./HEALTH & Soc'Y, Spring 1983, at
149.
4. Gold & Kenny, Paying for Maternity Care, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVE 103 (1985).
5. Monheit, Hagan, Berk & Wilensky, Health Insurance for the Unemployed: Is Federal Legislation
Needed?, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1984, at 101.
Several factors explain the growing numbers of people without insurance. Cuts in federal
domestic spending and states' fiscal stringency have generated sharp restrictions in the state-federal
Medicaid programs that insure many of the poorest of the poor. R. BOVBJERG & J. HOLAHAN,
MEDICAID IN THE REAGAN ERA: FEDERAL POLICY AND STATE CHOICES 12-16 (1982). Changes in
employment patterns-high unemployment, declining unionization, and shifts from manufacturing
to service work-have reduced medical insurance provided through employment related groups.
Adams, Changing Employment Patterns of Organized Workers, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1985, at 25, 26;
Serrin, U.S. Cites Continued Drop in Union Membership, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1985, at B5, col. 1; Swartz,
supra note 2, at 5. Intensified insurance price competition, including much self-insurance by large
firms, has discouraged health insurers from community rating. Healthy groups of workers pay lower
rates based on their experience, and individuals and smaller or less healthy groups are often priced
out of the market.
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intensify efforts to limit charity care. 6 While many doctors and hospitals
voluntarily provide care to people who are unable to pay, the law can also
encourage such behavior.
Legal obligations to provide charity care are very limited, however.
Doctors have no duty to provide any at all, even in an emergency. 7 Some
states require hospitals to treat people who need acute, emergency care, but
not to provide the ordinary, primary care that many people need.8 Even such
limited duties are difficult to enforce.9 The possibility that someone injured
when care is denied may sue for malpractice often provides the most
persistent pressure for hospital compliance.
Charity care obligations enforced by malpractice threats are a disgracefully
inadequate response to patient needs for medical care. Generally,
malpractice remedies arise only after an individual patient has been turned
away and thereby injured and cannot practicably be enforced unless the injury
is severe. In a society as wealthy as ours, minimal decency demands more
than malpractice threats promoting haphazard charity. Public programs such
as Medicaid could be expanded, or payment formulae could be implemented
that reimburse hospitals for the care they provide to the uninsursed.' 0
Another alternative would be to do what every other developed nation and
even many developing ones have done and create a national health insurance
or service program.
But programs to spread the cost of medical services for the poor and sick
are as politically vulnerable as these people are politically weak. Hospitals,
particularly those in areas of high unemployment and poverty, are caught
between tightening reimbursement schedules and growing requests for
charity care. Charity enforced by malpractice risk helps enfranchise the poor
by inspiring hospitals to articulate the needs of both the hospitals and the
people that they serve.1 '
6. See, e.g., Two More Tragic Examples of Patient Dumping Come to Light, 144 HEALTH ADVOC. 3
(1985); Wilensky, Solving Uncompensated Hospital Care, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1984, at 50.
7. Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901), articulates the classic view. See
generally W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 373-77 (5th ed. 1984).
8. Such duties may be imposed through licensing standards or by common law tort doctrine.
See, e.g., Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975); Wilmington Gen.
Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 10, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). See generally Note, To Treat or Not to Treat: A
Hospital's Duty to Provide Emergency Care, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 1047 (1982).
9. Chaan & Pave, When the Patient Can't Pay the Aedical Bills, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 18, 1985, at 59-60;
Roemer & Mera, "Patient Dumping" and Other Voluntary Agency Contributions to Public Agency Problems, 11
MED. CARE 30 (1973). On the difficulty of enforcing the free and below-cost care obligations of
hospitals that have received federal Hill-Burton construction grants, see Rosenblatt, Health Care
Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243 (1978). For a summary of
contemporary Hill-Burton requirements, see American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
10. See Wilensky, supra note 6, at 55-58; see also STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEMS FOR FINANCING
HOSPITAL CARE 5-9 (Comm. Print 1983); Demkovitch, Verdict is Still Out on Prototype of New Hospital
Cost-Cutting Plan, 15 NAT'LJ. 2573 (1983).
11. For an excellent collection of articles addressing the problems of the uninsured and the
hospitals that serve them, see HOSPITALS AND THE UNINSURED POOR: MEASURING AND PAYING FOR
UNCOMPENSATED CARE (S. Rogers, A. Rousseau & S. Nesbitt eds. 1984).
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B. Costs
The high and rising price of medical care and insurance to cover it pose
another major, not unrelated, problem for consumers and patients in America
today. Medical care spending is a major item in state 12 and federal 13 budgets,
and now constitutes a burden for employers' 4 as well as consumers.
While such high costs create very serious problems, malpractice premiums
contribute little to them. Malpractice insurance premiums account for only
about one percent of the nation's 350 billion dollar bill for personal health
care services. 15 Between 1976 and 1983 the proportion of gross income that
the average physician paid for malpractice insurance actually decreased from
4.40% to 3.69%.16
Many doctors sincerely believe that the risk of malpractice increases
medical costs by requiring them to do unnecessary tests and procedures solely
to avoid liability. However, the nature, extent, and cost of such "defensive
medicine" are unclear. 17 Iatrogenic injuries, that is, those caused by medical
intervention, generate enormous human suffering and financial cost.' 8 If, as
seems likely, the threat of medical malpractice liability prevents even a small
portion of these treatment-induced injuries, then, even in purely financial
terms, malpractice liability saves more than it costs.' 9
The troubling phenomenon of rising medical costs must be addressed
directly. After a decade of effort, hospital costs have been somewhat
12. Medicaid is often the largest single item in state budgets. See Demkovich, For States Squeezed
by Medicaid Costs, The Worst Crunch is Yet to Come, 13 NAT'L. J. 44 (1981). Six states spent over one
billion dollars each for Medicaid in fiscal 1980-although roughly 50% of this amount represents
federal contributions. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
DATA BOOK 116 (1983).
13. The Medicare hospital insurance program (Part A) is the second largest item in the federal
domestic budget, exceeded only by Social Security. Medicare's program for paying physician fees
(Part B) is the third largest program, and also the fastest growing of the major domestic spending
programs. STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., MEDICARE: PAYING THE
PHYSICIAN-HISTORY, ISSUES AND OPTIONS 2 (Comm. Print 1984) (Prepared by Lynn Etheredge)
[hereinafter cited as 1984 SENATE COMM. PRINT].
14. Demkovich, Business Drive to Curb Medical Costs Without Much Help From Government, 16 NAT'LJ.
1508 (1984); Putting a Lid on Corporations' Health Costs, DUNN'S REV., Sept. 1980, at 96.
15. Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice: Hearings on S.2501, S.2502, S.2503, and S.2504
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1984) (testimony of
Patricia M. Danzon, Associate Professor, Center for Health Policy Research and Education, Duke
University) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
16. R. PIERCE, supra note 1, at 8 (citing AMA data).
17. See S. LAw & S. POLAN, supra note 1, at 114-15; Hershey, The Defensive Practice of Medicine:
Myth or Reality, MILBANK MEM. FUND. Q/HEALTH & SoC'Y, Jan. 1972, at 69; Note, The Malpractice
Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939.
18. Unnecessary care is part of the problem. For example, a 1975 congressional subcommittee
staff report estimated that over two million unnecessary surgical operations are conducted yearly in
U.S. hospitals, leading to nearly 12,000 unnecessary deaths. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D
SESS., COST AND QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE: UNNECESSARY SURGERY at iii, 30, 33-34 (Subcomm. Print
1976). For the AMA's critique of this estimating methodology, see AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, A CRITIQUE
ON COST AND QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE: UNNECESSARY SURGERY (May 1976), discussed in Sparer,
Gordian Knots: The Situation Of Health Care Advocacy For The Poor Today, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 12
n.44 (1981).
19. Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 7.
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restrained by administrative action under Medicare and Medicaid,2 0
regulation for all payers in several states, 2' and consumer and business
resistance.2 2 Physician costs continue to rise steeply.2 3 Insurers can cut their
costs most easily by shifting them to patients, through increased deductibles
and coinsurance, as well as through increased premiums. In recent years the
out-of-pocket obligations that insured patients face at time of illness have
increased dramatically. 2 4 Doctors take home more income than any other
class of workers in this society, an average of $106,300 in 1983.25 Yet, society
has not developed ways to pay doctors that both assure them fair
compensation and constrain soaring medical costs. 26 Those who view the
problem of medical costs through the prism of alleged excesses in malpractice
premiums blind themselves to a social problem of great importance to both
doctors and patients.
General data thus demonstrate plainly that malpractice premiums neither
drive medical cost increases nor significantly impede access. Aggregate
information obviously does not describe every particular situation. Some
health care workers-nurse midwives serving low income people or
obstetricians in rural areas, for example-may provide essential services for
prices that do not allow them to absorb large increases in malpractice
premiums. Organized medicine uses such cases to advocate relief for all
doctors from "onerous" premiums. Perhaps a subsidy is needed for
premiums for some particular medical providers who meet essential needs at
earning levels that cannot sustain rising malpractice premiums. While
aggregate data do not disclose everything about the impact of malpractice
premiums, they do indicate one thing: major legal reforms cannot sensibly be
addressed to idiosyncratic problems.
20. See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 98TH
CONG., I ST SESS., CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as
1983 HOUSE CONFERENCE].
21. See, e.g., Schramm, A State-Based Approach to Hospital-Cost Containment, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
603 (1981); Sloan, Rate Regulation as a Strategy for Hospital Cost Control: Evidence from the Last Decade, 61
MILBANK FUND. Q 195 (1983).
22. See Demkovich, supra note 14.
23. See, e.g., 1984 SENATE COMM. PRINT, supra note 13, at 8.
24. One study of the health insurance policies offered by 1,185 large corporations between 1982
and 1984 shows that the proportion requiring a front-end deductible for surgical fees increased from
34% to 59%, and the proportion paying the full balance of the surgeon's fees decreased from 42%
to 26%. Goldsmith, Death of a Paradigm: The Challenge of Competition, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1984, at 5
(citing Hewitt Associates, Company Practices in Health Care Cost Management-1984 (survey)). For
general information on out-of-pocket costs for individuals eligible for Medicare, see Davis &
Rowland, Reforming Medicare: A New Approach to Financing, in 1983 HOUSE CONFERENCE, supra note 20,
at 98 (in 1981 the average person eligible for Medicare paid $1,154 in out-of-pocket medical costs).
25. Net Income Averaged $106,300 in '83, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 5, 1984, at 2, col. 2. Heads of
Fortune 500 companies, of course, earn more than doctors, but do not constitute a recognizable
professional class: most aspirants to that status fail, whereas almost all medical school graduates
succeed.
26. See generally 1984 SENATE COMM. PRINT, supra note 13.
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C. Quality of Care and Relationships
Even people who can afford medical care too often suffer unnecessary
injury and anxiety. Some patients are injured by chronically incompetent
physicians. Others are hurt by doctors who, while generally competent,
sometimes fail to take reasonable care. Many patients find it difficult to learn
about their conditions and to participate in making treatment choices. Others
are hurt by a lack of coordination and communication among the people
involved in taking care of them. These problems relate to medical
malpractice actions, albeit in a complex way.
Most doctors and nurses are competent, conscientious, concerned, hard
working, honest, and are rarely, if ever, sued for medical malpractice. 27
However, significant numbers of doctors regularly practice medicine that is
inadequate by any standard. Some are senile. 28 Some are addicted to drugs,
including alcohol, that impair their skill and judgment.2 9 Others are poorly
trained.30 Whatever the reason, the most basic function of the malpractice
law is to deter medical practice that falls below any reasonable line of minimal
adequacy, and to compensate patients injured by such practice.
Unfortunately, malpractice claims do not provide strong deterrence for
doctors who are chronically incompetent. A doctor who is unable or
unwilling to confront his or her own impairment is unlikely to be restrained
by the threat of a legal or insurance claim. Doctors can do unreasonably
dangerous things for a considerable period of time without being sued,
27. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE & APPENDIX 12 (1973) (most American physicians "have never had a medical
malpractice suit filed against them and those who have, have rarely been sued more than once").
The incidence of suit may have gone up since that time. See SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PRO. LIAB.
AND INS., AM. MEDICAL Ass'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, REPORT 1, at 1 (originally
published as a supplement to AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 1984).
28. "Every physician knows some colleague who has to be watched carefully, an old friend or
even teacher for whom he hesitates to ring [sic] down the curtain even though he knows that the man
or woman has advanced beyond his or her competence." Spiro & Mandell, Visceral Viewpoints: Leaders
and the Swan-Who Should Do Family Practice, 295 NEW ENG.J. MED. 90 (1976). The extent of senility is
obviously difficult to quantify.
29. Physicians are the occupational category with the highest use of illicit drugs. Stout-Wiegand
& Trent, Physician Drug Use: Availability or Occupational Stress?, 16 INT'LJ. ADDICTIONS 317 (1981). The
AMA concedes that "the greater accessibility of drugs to physicians (than to others) may cause
physicians to be somewhat more susceptible to this problem," but that "alcoholism most likely
represents the greater problem in terms of number of physicians affected." Effect of Alcohol and Drug
Abuse on Productivity: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse and the Subcomm. on
Employment and Productivity of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-116
(1982) (testimony of AMA representatives William Y. Rial and LeClair Bissell).
30. In recent years, thousands of U.S. citizens unable to gain admission to a U.S. medical school
have studied in newly established schools in the Caribbean and Mexico. Imperato, An Overview of New
York State and the Offshore Medical Schools, 84 N.Y.S.J. MED. 337 (1984). These schools are not licensed
by anyone and commonly lack clinical facilities; there is substantial basis for concern about the
quality of education they provide. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges, Quality of Preparation for the Practice of
Medicine in Certain Foreign-Chartered Medical Schools, 56J. MED. EDUC. 963 (1981); Woodroffe, Offshore
Medical Schools, 2 LANCET 546 (1982). Yet many of these schools' graduates finish their training in the
United States, often in the weakest, least sought-after residency programs, then practice in this
country. A. GELLHORN, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GRADUATE MEDICAL
EDUCATION 50-74 (1985); see also Mick & Worobey, Foreign Medical Graduates in the 1980's: Trends in
Specialization, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 698 (1984).
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particularly if the physician has congenial personal relationships with patients,
colleagues, and hospital administrators. 31
Even if a malpractice claim is filed and succeeds, liability often imposes
little personal burden on the doctor because almost all doctors are insured.
Furthermore, insurers very seldom charge higher premiums to doctors who
are repeatedly held liable for medical malpractice, although they may
eventually restrict or drop coverage. 32 Nor do the responsible state agencies
do much to deter malpractice. In many states, malpractice claims are not even
reported to the state agency that licenses physicians. 33 In any case, those
agencies lack the resources even to investigate the complaints they do
receive. 34 Moreover, neither the state licensing agencies nor the medical
societies commonly provide strong grievance mechanisms as an alternative to
malpractice claims. A protective medical ethic deters conscientious doctors
from doing all they could to safeguard patients from colleagues whom they
perceive to be practicing beyond their competence. Thus, society does not do
all that reasonably could be done to limit the damage caused by chronically
incompetent doctors. Rising malpractice premiums should inspire greater
efforts, particularly on the part of physicians, to restrain doctors who practice
substandard medicine.3 5
Further, patients often have difficulty obtaining even rudimentary
information about their condition, the treatment options available to them,
and the record and qualifications of those who care for them. Again, society
does not do all that could be done to help patients make informed, intelligent
decisions about medical care. For example, the federally supported
Professional Review Organizations gather a tremendous amount of statistical
data about doctors and hospitals for Medicare payment purposes. They then
systematically deny patients access to that information. 36
31. Doctors involved in some of the most egregious cases of long-term damage to patients are
often described as warm and personable. See, e.g., How Well Does Medicine Police Itsef?., 15 MED. WORLD
NEWS 62 (1974); Rensberger, Death of Two Doctors Poses a Fitness Issue, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1975, at
AI, col. 5.
32. R. PIERCE, supra note 1, at 27. See generally Roddis & Stewart, The Insurance of Medical Losses,
1975 DUKE L.J. 1281.
33. S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 1, at 257. In response to the 1975 crisis, a number of states
required malpractice insurers to report such information to the licensing board.
34. 1984 data of the Federation of State Medical Boards shows that 16 states reported fewer
than two disciplinary actions per 1,000 doctors. Twenty-one states showed between two and five
disciplinary actions per 1,000 physicians. Only four states had more than nine discriplinary actions
per 1,000 doctors. Brinkley, Rules on Disciplining Incompetent U.S. Doctors Are Marked by Confusion, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 3, 1985, at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Brinkley, Rules]; see also Brinkley, U.S. Industry
and Physicians Attack Medical Malpractice, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1985, at AI, col. 1.
The classic study on discipline of incompetent doctors is R. DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND
DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES (1969). See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, supra
note 27, at 53-56; Graham, States Move to Catch Incompetent Doctors, But Progress Is Uneven, Wall St. J.,
May 1, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
35. Today, even the AMA supports more vigorous medical licensing. SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON
PRO. LIAB. AND INS., AM. MEDICAL Ass'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, REPORT 3, at 16 (1985)
(originally published as a supplement to AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 1985). "The AMA recommended the
same thing in 1961." Brinkley, Rules, supra note 34, at Al, col. 1.
36. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Department of HEW, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (denying
consumers access to aggregate data prepared by the Professional Standards Review Organizations,
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One malpractice doctrine-the law of informed consent-has somewhat
encouraged doctors to communicate better with patients and help patients
participate in treatment decisions. In the mid-1970's several malpractice
decisions rejected the prior notions that doctors' duty to communicate was
limited by customary professional practice and required that physicians
provide any information that would affect a reasonable person's judgment
about medical treatment 37-but even this apparent legal right to informed
consent falls well short of requiring the respectful sharing that many patients
want.38 Additionally, in response to the 1975 malpractice "crisis," many
states reinstituted the traditional principle that doctors are only required to
communicate as much information as other physicians in the community
commonly provide. 39
Apart from changing malpractice standards, other cultural developments
have also promoted communication and patient participation in medical
decisionmaking. Feminist transformation of consciousness and more general
self-health movements have generated millions of transactions of heightened
consumer awareness, if not outright rebellion against traditional doctor-
knows-best paternalism. 40 These shifts in turn produce profound changes in
doctor/patient relationships. Although broadened legal doctrines of
informed consent have been modified to reaffirm doctors' traditional
authority, changes in consciousness are not so easily rolled back.
Many physicians find it difficult to share uncertainty with patients.4 1 Much
more could be done to improve communication, especially with regard to
the Medicare predecessor of today's PRO's). The American Medical Association has successfully
blocked a bill to require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to study ways of making
available information accessible to consumers. See Brinkley, Doctors' Lobby Facing Unsolicited 2d
Opinions, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1984, at B6, col. 3.
37. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972). See generally J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
38. See Lidz & Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of Medical Care, in 2 PRESIDENT'S COMM.
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIOR RESEARCH,
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 317 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS].
39. See Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41
U. PITT. L. REV. 407 (1980).
40. Feminists have produced self-help books that enable women to understand their own
problems and empower them to deal with experts. For example, over two billion copies of BOSTON
WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OUR BODIES OUR SELVES (3d ed. 1984) have been sold (and an
additional 30,000 in Spanish). Beckwith, Boston WI'omen s Health Book Collective: Women Empowering
Women, 10 WOMEN AND HEALTH 1, 1 (1985). Feminists have also analyzed the medical profession's
treatment of women. See, e.g., S. ARMS, IMMACULATE DECEPTION: A NEW LOOK AT WOMEN AND
CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA (1975); B. EHRENRICH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE EXPERTS'
ADVICE TO WOMEN (1979).
More general self-help health advice is featured in Jane Brody's regular stories in the ATew, York
Times, frequent articles in many general circulation periodicals, and a rich paperback literature.
41. See generally J. KATZ, supra note 37 (especially ch. VII). The President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research supported extensive
surveys of patients and doctors and concluded, "Often patients were not told what treatment or
procedure had been ordered for them, much less asked to decide whether or not to accept it. The
purpose of the procedure was frequently obscure and the risks commonly went unmentioned.
Presentation of alternatives was extraordinarily rare." 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note
38, at 47 (quoting Appelbaum & Roth, Treatment Refusal in Medical Hospitals, in 2 MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS, supra note 38, at app. D, 411).
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risks and financial options.42 While many doctors are obsessed with the
dangers of malpractice liability, their beliefs and actions seem more based on
apocryphal stories shared in the cafeteria or locker room than on an objective
assessment of malpractice experience or the value of communication with
patients. Few medical schools require that doctors study even basic principles
of malpractice law in any systematic way.
4 3
Perhaps the most serious quality problems for patients arise because the
people responsible for care communicate poorly with one another and fail to
coordinate their work. The most extensive examination to date of the care
provided in an American teaching hospital concluded: "The central purpose
of the hospital-the care of patients, especially the personal aspects of that
care-was not controlled directly or effectively by the hospital or by
anyone.'44 Although this classic study is now almost twenty years old, the
problems of fragmentation have grown worse in recent years as medical
practice has become more specialized.
All of these problems-the chronically incompetent doctor, the need for
communication with patients and for coordination among care givers-
demand collective response. Patients cannot address these issues effectively
through atomized individual actions, whether in the form of malpractice suits
or individual contracts with providers. Medical coworkers, rather than
patients, are in the best position to identify the chronically incompetent
physician and to take action to limit the damage done. Even if more
information were available to individual patients, it would often be quite
difficult for them to evaluate the quality of their medical care and to take steps
to improve it, particularly when acute illness strikes suddenly. People who
work in hospitals have the greatest capacity to improve patterns of
coordination and communication. Patients, particularly organized patients
working through community groups, senior citizen organizations, or groups
formed to aid people suffering from particular conditions, could also play an
important role in such collective efforts.
Malpractice law has had some limited success in encouraging such
collective responses. For example, some courts have held hospitals liable
when patients were injured by chronically incompetent physicians. These
cases apply ordinary negligence principles to make hospitals responsible for
minimal monitoring structures to protect patients against the foreseeable,
preventable risks of injury by such doctors. 45 Such cases have prompted
42. Doctors rarely discuss the costs of treatment alternatives with their patients. Physicians
often do not even know how various choices affect their patients financially, including nonphysician
care and variations in insurance coverage. The President's Commission found that 70% of the public
believed that doctors should initiate discussion of the financial costs of treatment, but only 38% of
the doctors reported that they do so. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 38, at 78-79.
43. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 38, at 141.
44. R. DUFF & A. HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SOCIETY 375 (1968).
45. See, e.g., Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 340-41, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 161
(1982); Gonzales v. Nork, No. 228566 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct., Co. of Sacramento) (reported in S.
LAw & S. POLAN, supra note 1, at app. 215, 239-45), rev'don other grounds, 33 Cal. App. 3d 997, 109
Cal. Rptr. 428 (1973), afd, 20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978); Darling v.
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hospital accreditation organizations to incorporate similar principles into
their standards. 46
Many barriers inhibit cooperative, collective efforts to promote
communication and coordination of medical care and to limit the damage
done by chronical incompetents. Doctors are divided by specialization and a
tradition of departmental organization, particularly in hospitals. Doctors,
nurses, and other health care workers, who must cooperate to care for
patients, are divided by hierarchial organizational structures. 47 It is difficult
to develop relationships of mutual respect, sharing, and criticism between
physicians who are generally white, male, and affluent, and the people, often
nonwhite women, who provide most "hands-on" patient care in the hospital.
The law also discourages cooperative work. For example, basic legal and
cultural concepts of work conceive of employment'solely as an exchange in
which the worker gets a salary in return for doing a job, the content of which
is determined by the employer. 48 Under this view, nurses, and even salaried
doctors, have no legitimate interest in the content of the work that they do,
but only in their wages and working conditions. 49 Of course, salaried doctors
and nurses do actually care about their patients and the content of their work,
as do their corporate employers. Nonetheless, our dominant concepts of
work subtly undermine cooperation. For a second example, the antitrust law
condemns many forms of cooperative actions among active or potential
competitors. The antitrust principles applicable in this area are sufficiently
unsettled that doctors who take collective action to deal with a chronically
Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Il1. 2d 326, 331-33, 211 N.E.2d 253, 257-58 (1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 97 Wis. 2d 521, 529-30, 294
N.W.2d 501, 506 (Ct. App. 1980); see also Southwick, Hospital Liability: Two Theories Have Been Merged,
4 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 4-6 (1983); Comment, Patient Recovery-A Poor Prognosis for Hospitals? The Expanding
Scope of Hopsital Liability, 10 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 519, 532-40 (1983); Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice
Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1010-11 (1985).
46. Gonzales v. Nork, No. 228566 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct., Co. of Sacramento) (reported in S.
LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 1, at app. 241-46), rev'd on other grounds, 33 Cal. App. 3d 997, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 428 (1973), aFd, 29 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978), which influenced the
change in Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) policy, involved a doctor who
performed dozens of unnecessary operations over several years. His incompetence left many
patients dead or seriously injured. The JCAH sent a representative to testify that the hospital had
complied with all quality of care standards and norms. The court found that the hospital at which he
practiced had conformed to all accreditation, licensing, and customary standards for quality care.
Yet, the hospital had no mechanism to collect and evaluate relevant information about the
chronically incompetent, or even fraudulent, doctor. The court held this failure was unreasonable,
saying, "This may amount to holding the whole 'health care industry' ... negligent. And if it does,
so be it. Precedent is not wanting for such a holding." Id. at app. 244. In response to this lower
court decision, the JCAH amended its standards to require ongoing oversight of physicians. See S.
LAw & S. POLAN, supra note 1, at 54-69.
47. See generally Levitt, Men and Women As Providers of Health Care, 1 ISoc. ScI. & MED. 395 (1977).
48. See Lesnick, The Consciousness of Work and the Values of American Law, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 833
(1983).
49. For example, New York City bargains collectively with the interns and residents in its public
hospitals. The doctors can negotiate about the standard hours of their own shift, but they cannot
bargain about the staffing levels necessary to avoid the need for regular "emergency" 24-hour
service. City of New York v. Committee of Interns and Residents, No. B- 10-81 (Office of Collective
Bargaining, City of New York 1981).
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incompetent colleague have legitimate basis for concern about antitrust
liability .5
In brief, medical malpractice law is largely irrelevant to the problems
confronting consumers of medical care. It has some modest beneficial effects
in promoting emergency services to all, developing ways to monitor basic
physician competence, and fostering communication with patients.
Malpractice law may be a poor and inefficient means of promoting quality care
and healing relationships, but its very inadequacy helps to maintain pressure
to develop alternative social mechanisms to address these problems.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
In the past ten years, state legislatures have adopted many measures to
restrain malpractice premium rates. 52 The most common reforms limit
patient rights that had grown over time. Popular changes include limits on
the compensation that seriously injured patients can receive, tighter
restrictions on the time in which suit must be filed, limits on fees of patients'
lawyers, restrictions on the proof patients can use to establish medical
malpractice, and restrictions on the grounds upon which patients can
establish fault. Other contributors to this symposium advocate two
approaches, as yet little tried, that deserve special scrutiny: (1) private
contracting about malpractice rules or process, and (2) federal legislation to
induce prompt payment of victims' actual economic loss resulting from
medical care, whether or not the patient can establish fault.
A. Contracting
Clark Havighurst 53 and others54 urge that medical providers offer patients
contracts creating a different set of rules to govern what happens when a
patient is injured by medical treatment. Contracts could limit the
circumstances in which the provider could be held liable for the patient's
injury or could alter the process by which disputes were resolved.
Proposals to address the "crisis" through contracts altering the
substantive standard of care misconceive the nature of medical malpractice.
Malpractice claims often involve patients who have been seriously injured by
actions that no reasonable practitioner would approve. 55 Informed patients
who are free to choose will not absolve doctors of responsibility for such
conduct. Nor are contracts needed to protect providers from pressure to
provide overelaborate or unnecessary care. Malpractice standards are not
monolithic or rigid, but rather are tailored to circumstances. 56 Informed
consent law already allows doctors and patients to shape specific treatments to
52. R. PIERCE, supra note 1, at 18-19. See generally Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative
Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417.
53. Havighurst, Reforming Malpractice Law Through Consumer Choice, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1984, at
63.
54. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 95;
O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract for Doctors, Manufacturers, Retailers and Others, 1975 INS. L.J.
531; Stevens, Medical Malpractice: Some Implications of Contract and Arbitration in HMO's, MILBANK MEM.
FUND Q /HEALTH & Soc'Y, Winter 1981, at 59.
55. See Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice on Trial: Quality of Care Is the Important Standard, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 321, 330-31. Cases involving close medical judgments tend to be
decided in the doctor's favor. Helms, Preface to THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at i (S.
Rottenberg ed. 1978).
56. The black-letter law is that
[iun the absence of. . . [an unusual] express agreement, the doctor does not warrant or insure
either a correct diagnosis or a successful course of treatment, and the doctor will not be liable
for an honest mistake ofjudgment, where the proper course is open to reasonable doubt . ...
[Tihe doctor must have and use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and
employed by members of the profession in good standing . . . . Where there are different
schools of medical thought, and alternative methods of acceptable treatment, it is held that the
dispute cannot be settled by the law, and the doctor is entitled to be judged according to the
tenets of the school the doctor professes to follow.
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meet patients' preferences. 57 Doctors can avoid inefficient, costly treatment
by informing patients of the alternatives and allowing patient choice.
Proposals to encourage contracting-for specific services or for general
standards-also misconceive the market for medical services. Patients have
little capacity to make informed judgments about cost and quality trade-offs
prior to illness or to shop at time of serious illness. 58 Courts must carefully
evaluate contracts offered by doctors, especially those prepared by
professional associations for widespread use, lest they be merely adhesive
agreements. The contracts should be judged reasonable only if they benefit
both parties. 59 As a practical matter, moreover, informed patients who are
free to choose are unlikely to accept any significant reduction in the standards
of care. Patients generally want high quality at reduced costs, not cut rates
with fewer protections. 60 The main competition to traditional medical
practice comes from HMO's, which are at the high end of the quality spectrum
in terms of comprehensive benefits and physician credentials. 6' Few patients
will sacrifice quality in exchange for the trivial cost savings that can accurately
be attributed to the full cost of malpractice premiums. 62
W. KEETON, supra note 7, at 186-87.
Even as courts have abandoned the locality rule to hold physicians, particularly specialists, to
national standards, they have held that the resources available in a particular community can be
considered in determining what is reasonable: "It is permissible to consider the medical resources
available to the physician as one circumstance in determining the skill and care required. Under [the
national] standard, some allowance is made for the type of community in which the physician carries
on his practice .... ." Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 107, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968)
(emphasis in original). Note that practice varies considerably between communities. See infra note 71
and accompanying text.
When there is more than one accepted method of treatment for the patient's disease or injury, a
physician will not be liable for choosing any acceptable mode of treatment. See, e.g., Harwell v.
Pittman, 428 So. 2d 1049, 1053 (La. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 434 So. 2d 1092 (La. 1983) ("Whether or
not to operate is a matter of clinical judgment for the treating surgeon after weighing all the facts
before him."); Roberts v. Tardif, 417 A.2d 444, 448-49 (Me. 1980) ("A doctor is not liable for injury
resulting when he pursues one of several acceptable courses of treatment meeting the applicable
standard of care in the circumstance, even though an alternative procedure also meeting that
standard might have avoided the injury."); Kinning v. Nelson, 281 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Minn. 1979)
(physician not responsible for an honest error in judgment in choosing between accepted methods of
diagnosis); Furey v. ThomasJefferson Univ. Hosp., 325 Pa. Super. 212, 224-26, 472 A.2d 1083, 1090
(1984) (medical authorities were so split on whether surgery or antibiotic therapy was proper that
each side characterized the other's treatment as malpractice: in these circumstances, there is no
liability, even if the alternative accepted treatment would have avoided the injury).
57. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. The doctrine by implication also shows that
malpractice law already allows flexible practice. If malpractice standards were monolithic, there
would be no purpose in informing patients about alternative treatment options available to them.
58. For an eloquent statement of the problem, see Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets, and
Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1067, 1080 (1981).
59. See Ginsburg, Kahn, Thornhill & Gambardella, Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice
Liability, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 253, 255.
60. See generally Blendon & Altman, Public Attitudes About Health-Care Costs: A Lesson in National
Schizophrenia, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 613 (1984) (53% of Americans favor more social spending for
health care, but at the same time, and not inconsistently, express concern about rising prices of
health care and out-of-pocket costs).
61. The classic work on HMO's is H. Lu-r, HEALTI. MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS
OF PERFORMANCE (1981). For a more recent discussion, see Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, A REPORT
CARD ON HMO's: 1980-1984 SUMMARY REPORT (1984).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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Contracts that alter the forum in which malpractice claims are decided
have greater potential to serve the interests of both physicians and patients.
Adversary litigation is not always the best means of resolving human
conflict.63 Today, many people find it cheaper, faster, and less traumatic to
resolve disputes through arbitration rather than through more formal,
adversary litigation.
The dilemma in substituting arbitration for litigation is that streamlining
reforms may sacrifice some element of fairness to one party or the other.
Those very characteristics which make the judicial process cumbersome and
inefficient-the rights to discovery, cross examination, appeal, and principled
decisionmaking-also help to assure fairness to each side. To achieve
economies of cost, time, and formality, arbitration procedures must be
different from judicial proceedings. Conversely, maintaining judicial-style
protections in arbitration burdens it with similar delays and complexities. 64
People's tastes for formalized adversary processes vary, however. Particularly
for relatively small claims-for which courtroom resolution is not financially
feasible-arbitration may provide a sensible means to resolve malpractice
disputes, one that meets the needs of both doctors and patients.
Binding agreements to arbitrate should only be upheld if they are
informed and voluntary. 65 Under present law, doctors and patients can
always agree to arbitrate after a dispute arises.66 When such agreements are
signed prior to treatment, however, they are usually constructed by doctors
and their lawyers and often offered to patients at the point they seek medical
care. Doctors seem to find arbitration attractive because they believe it will
reduce premiums, but it is difficult to devise a program that is both less costly
and attractive to informed consumers. Arbitration cannot fairly be sold to
patients by emphasizing only its positive aspects, without providing the
balanced information necessary to allow informed choice. There is an
inherent tension between providers' desire to lower premiums and patients'
desire for an arbitration program that offers them real benefits.
B. Federally Mandated Solutions
The most radical proposals for addressing the malpractice crisis would
impose uniform federal answers to the vexing questions that malpractice
raises. The Moore-Gephardt bill is the best developed proposal. 67 It would
virtually require states to adopt one specific reform-to allow providers to
foreclose patients' claims for pain and suffering by tendering payment for net
63. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadoe, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984).
64. See, e.g., Lash, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Disputes as a Response to the Medical Malpractice
Crisis: Panacea or Pandora's Box for Insurers?, 46 INS. COUNS. J. 102, 102 (1979); see also Note, Medical
Malpractice Arbitration: A Patient's Perspective, 61 WASH. U.L.Q 123 (1983).
65. Note, supra note 64, at 144-50.
66. Id. at 155-56.
67. H.R. 3084, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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out-of-pocket economic loss within 180 days of an adverse medical
"incident." 68
This interesting proposal raises many questions. When a patient is
blinded or loses a limb because a doctor did something that no reasonable
physician would have done, is it fair to say that the only legitimate losses the
doctor should be required to pay are damages to the patient's established
earning capacity and actual medical expenses (reduced by whatever amount
the patient's other insurance policies will pay)? When a person is blinded or
loses a limb, that injury is only "pain and suffering" in legal terms, except to
the extent that the patient's earning capacity is diminished. Under the
proposed law, people would be worth only what they can earn, or what they
cost in terms of net medical expense. 69 Loss of the ability to enjoy life or rear
children, freedom and joy of movement and perception, are compensable, if
at all, as an item of "pain and suffering" that the bill would abolish.
What, if anything, would motivate a doctor or hospital to tender payment
of actual economic loss in cases where lost earning capacity and medical
expenses were large, and the "pain and suffering" damages were relatively
small? 70 Would this proposal increase or reduce premium costs? Would it
give doctors, or patients, a sense that the malpractice law operated in a fairer
and more efficient way? The answers to all of these questions are unclear.
In this country there is tremendous local and regional variation in
customary medical practice 71 as well as in the organization and financing of
medical care. 72 Further, there is a deep tradition of state, rather than federal
responsibility for the key issues of malpractice: development of common law
principles of negligence; 73 licensing and regulation of hospitals, physicians,
and other health care workers;74 provision of medical care to the unin-
68. The bill would also preempt state malpractice laws in cases arising from services financed by
Medicare, Medicaid, and other federally funded programs. States would have several years to
establish an alternative medical liability system conforming to the bill's requirements to avoid this
preemption.
69. Courts have split in evaluating state laws that limit the amount of damages plaintiffs can
recover for pain and suffering in malpractice cases. Compare Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind.
374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (upholding a limit on pain and suffering damages), with Carson v.
Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (striking down such a limitation). The Moore-Gephardt
bill would go much further, not merely limiting pain and suffering damages but eliminating
noneconomic damages in affected cases.
70. Supporters argue that hospitals will tender payment to injured patients to avoid the cost of
litigation. Since only a small portion of injured patients ever sue, however, and most of those never
recover damages, it is unlikely that hospitals will be motivated to tender payments voluntarily.
71. See Wilensky, supra note 6. The seminal research was Wennberg & Gittelsohn, Small Area
Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 102 (1973). Variations are particularly likely where
there is professional uncertainty concerning diagnosis or treatment. See generally Wennberg, Barnes
& Zubkoff, Professional Uncertainty and the Problem of Supplier-Induced Demand, 16 Soc. ScI. MED. 811
(1982).
72. See supra notes 20-21 on divergent approaches to hospital financing. For a description of
diversity in physician payment methods, see Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 582 F. Supp. 734 (D.
Mass.), affld in part and vacated in part, 749 F.2d 922 (lst Cir. 1984), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 105 S. Ct.
2040 (1985); see also 1984 SENATE COMM. PRINr, supra note 13.
73. "There is no federal general common law." Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80
(1938).
74. See generally R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 34.
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sured;75 and regulation of insurance. 76 States accordingly have much greater
experience than the federal government with these issues. Moreover, any
"solution" will have different effects when introduced in divergent contexts.
The federal government could play an important role addressing some
discrete, well-defined problems. For one example, state-by-state licensing of
physicians sometimes allows a doctor disciplined in one state to move to a
new area where it is difficult to find reliable information about his or her
history. 77 A federal clearinghouse of information about state disciplinary
actions could ameliorate this problem. For a second example, state insurance
regulators must rely on industry sources and self-reporting for information
about liability insurers that operate in national markets. 78  Further,
determination of reasonable liability insurance rates and reserves is an
exceedingly complex matter. A federal clearinghouse of information and
ideas could provide valuable aid to state regulators.
More generally, however, for decades states have grappled with the
problems surrounding malpractice and have tried divergent approaches.
Justice Brandeis once observed, "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country." 79 States are trying new approaches to malpractice,
now more than ever.80 If they prove beneficial, other states can and will adopt
them.
If in the experience of several states, some approaches clearly help, history
suggests that other states will follow suit. If they do not, then Congress can
impose changes on everyone. Today, however, there are few tested responses
to the many problems of medical malpractice that are so plainly correct that
they should be imposed by federal fiat. For Congress to dictate a federal no-
fault system or any other untried proposal, without first testing it in even a
single state, would be sheer hubris and folly.
75. See supra note 6 and accompanying text, on reimbursement for charity care. Public hospital
services are also traditionally local and state responsibilities. See Brown, Public Hospitals on the Brink:
Their Problems and Their Options, 7J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 927, 929 (1983).
Under both Medicaid and the Hill-Burton construction program, see supra note 9, federal funds
are provided to support state-administered programs. Medicare is the only significant financing
program for health services to the public that is not shaped and administered by the states.
76. See generally S. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? (2d ed. 1976). For a discussion of
divergent state laws mandating that insurance include particular forms of benefits and protections,
see Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, -U.S.-, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2383-84 (1985); see also
McGuire & Montgomery, Mandated Mental Health Benefits in Private Health Insurance, 7 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 380 (1982).
77. See Brinkley, Rules, supra note 34, at Al, col. 1.
78. S. LAw & S. POLAN, supra note 1, at 188-94 (need for federal action to supplement state
insurance regulation).
79. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
80. See supra note 1.
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